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Presuming Innocence: Expanding the 
Confrontation Clause Analysis to Protect 
Children and Defendants in Child Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions 
Anna Richey-Allen∗ 
In an otherwise quiet courtroom, a prosecutor presses a 
button on a remote control and presents his witness: a young 
child on the television screen who is unwittingly testifying in a 
court of law.1 The jurors hear three-year-old T.B. answer exten-
sive questions from a child protection worker who recorded the 
interview months earlier.2 T.B. gives the name of the defen-
dant, Orlando Bobadilla.3 He says that Bobadilla touched his 
“booty” and verifies that his booty is his buttocks.4 When the 
tape finishes, silence again consumes the courtroom as twenty-
three-year-old Bobadilla is left without recourse in front of the 
jury—his opportunity to question T.B. had just been turned off 
with the television.5 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003, 
Sarah Lawrence College. The author thanks Professor Stephen Cribari and 
the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, particularly Damon Brin-
son. She also sends a very special “mahalo” to Abigail Richey-Allen for love, 
encouragement, and for sacrificing a day in Hawaii to help edit. Copyright © 
2008 by Anna Richey-Allen. 
 1. This introduction is taken from the Minnesota Supreme Court case, 
State v. Bobadilla (Bobadilla II), 709 N.W.2d 243, 247–48 (Minn. 2006), which 
reversed the Minnesota Court of Appeals, State v. Bobadilla (Bobadilla I), 690 
N.W.2d 345, 349–50 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), but which was recently discredited 
upon federal habeas review. Bobadilla v. Carlson (Bobadilla III), 570 F. Supp. 
2d 1098, 1100 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting an order of habeas corpus relief for 
Orlando Bobadilla). 
 2. Bobadilla III, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 247. 
 5. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 246. At trial, Orlando Bobadilla was una-
ble to cross-examine his accuser. After the videotape of T.B.’s statements, he 
was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the interviewer who took the 
stand to provide foundation for the video. Id. at 248. 
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Such a story is not unique in child sexual abuse cases. 
While defendants face long-term prison sentences6 and ostrac-
ism during child sexual abuse trials,7 alleged child victims may 
not appear in court to testify.8 Judges will often find that child-
ren are incompetent to testify, as in T.B.’s case, because child-
ren can be stunned into silence on the witness stand or fail to 
understand basic notions of the truth.9 Prosecutors must thus 
rely heavily on hearsay exceptions to admit a child victim’s out-
of-court statements at trial.10 
Two Supreme Court cases, Crawford v. Washington11 and 
Davis v. Washington12 bolstered the Confrontation Clause 
analysis for admitting hearsay at criminal trials.13 If a witness 
 
 6. Criminal sexual misconduct is often a felony, sentenced by terms of 
decades. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2006) (punishing criminal sexual 
conduct in the first degree, including sexual contact with persons under the 
age of thirteen, with up to thirty years in prison). In some states, child sexual 
abuse carries sentences comparable to murder. See MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 750.520b (2007) (punishing criminal sexual conduct, which includes sexual 
penetration with a person under thirteen years of age, by imprisonment for 
life or for any terms of years, with exceptions); Man Draws 145-Year Sentence 
for Sexual Abuse of 7-Year-Old, FORT BEND NOW, Feb. 13, 2006, http://www 
.fortbendnow.com/printer_friendly/9432. 
 7. Persons accused and convicted of crimes suffer from broken social ties 
during their incarceration regardless of the crime. See, e.g., Joseph Murray, 
The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and Children of Prisoners, in THE 
EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT 442, 442 (Alison Liebling & Shadd Maruna eds., 
2005) (“Loss of outside relationships is considered the most painful aspect of 
confinement for prisoners.”). Child sexual abusers are even more frequently 
shunned as outcasts. E.g., Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton’s Cen-
tral Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1172 
(1990). Because child molesters are considered social pariahs, they are often 
exposed to in-prison violence. Id. 
 8. Children may be found unavailable to testify if they are incompetent 
because of mental capacity or age, an inability to discern the truth, or an ina-
bility to convey testimony to the jury. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the 
Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall 
Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 921–22 (2007). 
 9. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 248. For more discussion on the effects of 
trial on children, see Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children as Witnesses 
After Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2005 (1992). See also Myrna 
Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 
376 (2005) (discussing how trial may retraumatize abused children). 
 10. See, e.g., John H. Gleason, Crawford v. Washington and the Limits on 
Admitting Hearsay in Criminal Trials, 93 ILL. B.J. 408, 411 (2005) (“For years, 
prosecutors have relied on evidence of hearsay statements, especially in child-
abuse and domestic-abuse cases.”). 
 11. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 12. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 13. Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
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is unavailable to testify in court, prosecutors may only admit 
so-called testimonial hearsay if the defendant had a prior op-
portunity to cross-examine the declarant.14 Davis characterized 
this testimonial hearsay as statements made during non-
emergency questioning where the primary purpose of the ques-
tioning is to “potentially establish facts or events for prosecu-
tion.”15 
This primary purpose test poses significant problems in 
child sexual abuse cases. Most states require that child abuse 
investigations combine the efforts of police, psychologists, social 
workers, nurses, and doctors.16 Child advocacy centers, many 
functioning with funding from local prosecutor’s offices or the 
Department of Justice, are the hub of such investigations.17 
Replete with child-friendly rooms, anatomical dolls, and age-
appropriate questioning, these centers purport to help children 
through their difficult situations and gather evidence for trial.18 
Because of these multiple purposes of child advocacy cen-
ters,19 courts have struggled with how to treat statements pro-
duced during child advocacy centers’ forensic interviews, where 
trained specialists elicit a child’s story, oftentimes in front of a 
video camera.20 Some courts have determined that the psycho-
logical or medical services trump the advocacy centers’ prosecu-
 
 14. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 15. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 16. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006) (mandating cross-reporting and 
joint investigations of child abuse allegations by law enforcement and child 
welfare agencies). All fifty states mandate some type of reporting. Elizabeth J. 
Stevens, Deputy-Doctors: The Medical Treatment Exception After Davis v. 
Washington, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 451, 477 (2007); see also, Mosteller, supra note 
8, at 952 (discussing the mandatory reporting laws and requirements). 
 17. See Nancy Chandler, Children’s Advocacy Centers: Making a Differ-
ence One Child at a Time, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 315, 330 (2006). 
 18. For an example of a child advocacy center’s goals and services, see 
CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, http://www.cornerhousemn.org/ 
forensic.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). The National Children’s Advocacy 
Center also provides a general example of a child advocacy center. See The Na-
tional Children’s Advocacy Center, The CAC Model, http://www.nationalcac 
.org/professionals/model/cac_model.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter 
NCAC, The CAC Model]. 
 19. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 8, at 965–75 (discussing the multiple 
purposes behind making and gathering statements in child-abuse situations). 
 20. See State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *5 (Idaho Ct. 
App. Aug. 11, 2006); State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 778 (Kan. 2007); State 
v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. 2007); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 
877 (Mo. 2006); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 2006); State v. Mack, 
101 P.3d 349, 349 (Or. 2004). 
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torial goals, while others have disagreed.21 In fact, Bobadilla 
had to wait through several state court appeals before a federal 
district court decided that his Sixth Amendment right to con-
frontation had been violated, granting him habeas corpus re-
lief.22 Unfortunately, this was after the court had sentenced 
him to 144 months in prison.23 
This Note explores the prosecutorial use of children’s 
statements made during forensic child advocacy interviews. 
Part I provides a background of the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the Confrontation Clause, child sexual abuse prosecu-
tion, child advocacy centers, and select state cases on this issue. 
Part II argues that child advocacy centers have many purposes, 
but where there is direct prosecutorial involvement in the in-
terviews and no alternative-theory testing of the child, state-
ments obtained in such interviews violate a defendant’s con-
frontation rights when used at trial absent the declarant’s 
testimony. Part III proposes that the Confrontation Clause 
analysis should expand to include presumptions that will guide 
courts in determining whether such statements should be ad-
missible. This solution not only protects the integrity of the 
Sixth Amendment but also recognizes the unique difficulties of 
child sexual abuse prosecutions. 
I.  THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, CHILD ADVOCACY 
CENTERS, AND STATE COURT RULINGS ON FORENSIC 
INTERVIEW STATEMENTS   
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him. . . .”24 There has been significant development in the Con-
frontation Clause analysis that deals with accusatory hearsay. 
 
 21. Compare Henderson, 160 P.3d at 786 (emphasizing the importance of 
law enforcement and criminal prosecution), with Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 642 
(finding that the purpose of section 626.556 of the Minnesota Statutes is not to 
prosecute criminals or collect evidence for trial but to protect children whose 
health or welfare may be jeopardized). 
 22. The Minnesota Court of Appeals first decided that Bobadilla’s confron-
tation rights had been violated, Bobadilla I, 690 N.W.2d 345, 349–50 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2004), but the state supreme court reversed. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 
243, 257 (Minn. 2006). The federal district court that granted habeas relief to 
Bobadilla found that Minnesota engaged in an “[u]nreasonable [a]pplication” 
of the law. Bobadilla III, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 23. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 246. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right applies to states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
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Child abuse cases often involve a child who cannot testify, and 
child advocacy centers purport to fix this problem by conduct-
ing pretrial forensic interviews.25 But courts have recently 
struggled with how to treat the statements obtained in those 
interviews. 
A. HEARSAY AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES 
The right to confront witnesses is the right to cross-
examine them—a fundamental principle, vital to discerning the 
truth at trial.26 Face-to-face confrontation in particular—where 
a defendant cross-examines a witness in court—is considered 
essential for a fair trial. Facing a witness allows jurors to judge 
a witness’s demeanor. The uncertainty in a witness’s voice, and 
the perspiration on his brow, are supposed to reveal something 
about a witness’s story that an audio or video tape, written 
record, or repetition by a third party cannot.27 
It has not been clear, however, whether the Confrontation 
Clause’s right to confrontation also applies to a witness’s out-of-
court statements, or hearsay.28 Because of its unreliability, 
hearsay is generally barred from trial unless the statement 
falls under an exception.29 The Supreme Court previously held 
that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied when the hearsay 
was sufficiently reliable,30 but two Supreme Court cases, Craw-
ford and Davis, recognized that the core concern of the Sixth 
Amendment is procedural. It does not matter that hearsay 
statements are reliable, but rather that the defendant is able to 
 
 25. See Chandler, supra note 17, at 332 (discussing forensic interviewing). 
 26. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989). 
 27. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The primary 
object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte af-
fidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of . . . cross-examination of 
the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to 
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge 
by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief.” (quoting Mattox v. United States, 56 
U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895))). 
 28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (“The Consti-
tution’s text does not alone resolve this case. One could plausibly read ‘witness 
against’ a defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial . . . .”). 
 29. See FED. R. EVID. 803. Commonly used hearsay exceptions are state-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis, present sense impressions, and 
excited utterances. Id. 803(1), (2), & (4). 
 30. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
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cross-examine all witnesses who “bear testimony” both in and 
out of court.31 
1. Supreme Court Determinations: From Reliable to 
Testimonial Hearsay 
Under Ohio v. Roberts, courts could admit hearsay at trial 
through discretionary standards.32 As long as a statement bore 
sufficient “indicia of reliability,” meaning that it fell within a 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” or had “particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness,” the Sixth Amendment did not pro-
hibit the admission of the testimony.33 In Crawford, however, 
the Court argued that the reliability standard of Roberts was 
an “amorphous, if not entirely subjective concept”34 because it 
allowed judges to individually devise which factors were trust-
worthy, without affording the defendant his fundamental right 
to confront the testimony against him.35 
The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause arose from 
a concern for the civil law practice of using ex parte interviews 
(or interrogations held in the absence of the accused) to prose-
cute defendants.36 Common law initially borrowed these as-
pects of civil law37 until the infamously corrupt trial of Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh.38 The evidence against Raleigh was the ex parte 
testimony of his alleged accomplice who saved himself by impli-
cating Raleigh in a private pretrial hearing.39 The trial judge 
refused to let Raleigh confront the witness, and despite Ra-
leigh’s pleas to have his accuser called “before [his] face,” the 
judge ultimately sentenced Raleigh to death.40 
To prevent such injuries to justice and to protect the rights 
of the accused, cross-examination developed through a series of 
statutory reforms and practices that are reflected in the Sixth 
Amendment.41 In Crawford, the Court found that the “unpar-
donable vice” of the reliability standard in Roberts was that 
 
 31. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
51. 
 32. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 50. 
 37. Id. at 43. 
 38. Id. at 44. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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courts were admitting ex parte statements which the Confron-
tation Clause intended to exclude.42 Confrontation was the only 
indicium of reliability that satisfied the Sixth Amendment, re-
gardless of the admissibility of statements under famed hear-
say exceptions.43 
Not all out-of-court statements invoke the Sixth Amend-
ment, however.44 Because the Confrontation Clause historically 
concerned accusatory statements—that is, testimonial state-
ments “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact”45—the Sixth Amendment protects defendants from testi-
monial hearsay where there was no prior opportunity to cross-
examine a witness who is unavailable to testify in court.46 Out-
of-court statements that are nontestimonial are admissible, 
provided they fall under a hearsay exception.47 
2. Definitions of Testimonial Hearsay 
As it stands, there is no simple definition of “testimonial.” 
In Crawford, the Court identified a “core class” of testimonial 
hearsay that includes ex parte testimony or its “functional 
equivalent.”48 This class includes statements such as those 
“that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecuto-
rially, . . . extrajudicial statements contained in formalized tes-
timonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testi-
mony, or confessions” and statements that, under the 
circumstances, would lead an objective witness to believe that 
his statement would be “available for use at a later trial.”49 The 
Court applied this analysis in Crawford and Davis by looking 
at the case-specific circumstances at issue.50 
To the Court, the level of government involvement in the 
production of the statements,51 the formality of the interview,52 
 
 42. Id. at 63. 
 43. See id. at 69. One exception is dying declarations. Id. at 56 n.6. The 
Court indicated that “the existence of that exception as a general rule of crim-
inal hearsay law cannot be disputed.” Id. 
 44. Id. at 51. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 58. 
 47. Id. at 56. 
 48. Id. at 51–52. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817–21 (2006); Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 66–67. 
 51. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822–24. 
 52. See id. at 827, 831 n.5; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
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and the elapsed time between the alleged crime and the chal-
lenged statements were of particular concern for Confrontation 
Clause analysis.53 When the testimony is produced through the 
“involvement of government officers . . . with an eye toward tri-
al,” there is a “unique potential for prosecutorial abuse,” as 
demonstrated in Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial.54 While Crawford 
set forth the basic framework for defining testimonial state-
ments, it did not discuss statements that fell short of its clear-
cut example: a woman’s statements made while in police custo-
dy.55 
A few years after Crawford, the Court further distin-
guished testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay in two consoli-
dated cases, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.56 
The Court held that statements are nontestimonial where the 
circumstances objectively indicate that police or their agents57 
are responding to an ongoing emergency.58 Statements are tes-
timonial when circumstances objectively indicate that there is 
no emergency, and the interrogation’s “primary purpose [is to] 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crim-
inal prosecution.”59 An “interrogation” is colloquially defined, 
meaning that interviews conducted by government agents are 
also subject to the testimonial framework.60 
There is some debate as to whether this framework should 
measure the declarant’s expectations. Davis set forth an objec-
tive-observer test by emphasizing the objective purpose of an 
interrogation, but a footnote suggests that the declarant’s ex-
pectation in answering the questions is still important to the 
constitutional analysis.61 Many courts and scholars, however, 
have either found that the objective observer test is correct 
“historically, doctrinally, and as a matter of policy,”62 or have 
 
 53. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 54. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
 55. Id. at 65. 
 56. Davis, 547 U.S. at 813. 
 57. Id. at 823 n.2 (“If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement 
officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct in-
terrogations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding 
the point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police.”). 
 58. Id. at 822. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
 61. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.1 (“[I]t is in the final analysis of the decla-
rant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation 
Clause requires us to evaluate.”). 
 62. Mosteller, supra note 8, at 984; see also Myrna Raeder, Comments on 
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placed little emphasis on the declarant’s expectations in the 
testimonial analysis.63 
Davis concluded that, where an alleged victim identified 
her abuser in response to a 911 operator’s immediate inquiries, 
the statements were nontestimonial and admissible.64 The 
Court stated that the victim was describing an ongoing emer-
gency in response to impromptu questioning by the operator, 
which was necessary to assist in her emergency.65 By contrast, 
the victim in Hammon gave handwritten statements directly to 
the police after they arrived at her house,66 and the statements 
were found to be inadmissible as testimonial hearsay.67 Al-
though officers arrived a mere four minutes after the call, the 
victim was in a separate room from the defendant when she 
provided the statements, and the statements described past 
events in response to police inquiries.68 
Read together, Crawford and Davis establish that testi-
monial hearsay will not be admissible where the witness is un-
available to testify at trial and the defendant has not had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. What is tes-
timonial depends on circumstances objectively indicating the 
interview’s primary purpose. 
B.  CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES AND ADVOCACY CENTERS 
Crawford and Davis pose problems for child abuse cases 
when children do not testify at trial, and such situations are 
commonplace.69 Most states have statutes determining that 
 
Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Compe-
tency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1012 (2007) (concluding 
that Davis accords with the objective-observer test). 
 63. See State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 785 (Kan. 2007) (“A young vic-
tim’s awareness, or lack thereof, that her statement would be used to prose-
cute, is not dispositive of whether her statement is testimonial.”); State v. Jus-
tus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006) (noting that a child could realize his 
statements would be used to prosecute an alleged offender). 
 64. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828–29. The Court noted that the operator’s inqui-
ries could have evolved into eliciting testimonial statements once the inquiries 
were no longer serving the emergency. Id. Trial courts were to strike these 
statements through motions in limine. Id. at 829. 
 65. Id. at 828. 
 66. Id. at 832. 
 67. Id. at 830. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Mosteller, supra note 8, at 920–22 (discussing how widespread the 
problem is because courts have discretionary power to find children incompe-
tent to testify and arguing that courts should encourage confrontation). 
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children under a certain age will be found incompetent to testi-
fy if they lack the capacity to understand basic notions of the 
truth, or are simply too terrified to testify.70 When the Supreme 
Court established the reliability test in Roberts, child advocacy 
centers were developing around the country71 and states 
enacted statutes guaranteeing the trustworthiness of a child’s 
statements given at advocacy centers.72 The statutes either ex-
plicitly stated that such statements were reliable,73 or they de-
lineated in detail the steps of a joint investigation, including 
the type of questioning that interviewers needed to ask, thus 
securing that a given statement would be reliable.74 
Child sexual abuse cases can be difficult to prosecute.75 
The shame that abused children feel often silences them, and 
victims can recant their stories.76 Child advocacy centers devel-
oped in the 1980s in an effort to empower children to come for-
ward and stop the cycle of abuse.77 Working as a team, prosecu-
 
 70. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(m) (2006). At least forty states have 
“tender years” statutes which determine competency with reference to age. 
Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 39 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
 71. Advocacy centers began developing in the mid-1980s. See, e.g., The 
National Children’s Advocacy Center, History, http://www.nationalcac.org/ 
ncac/history.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter NCAC, History] (de-
scribing the history of the National Children’s Advocacy Center). The Supreme 
Court heard Ohio v. Roberts on November 26, 1979. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 72. See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 320 (Md. 2005) (“Following Ro-
berts, many States enacted statutes allowing the admission into evidence of 
certain hearsay statements in criminal trials.”); see also T.P. v. State, 911 So. 
2d 1117, 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing how Alabama revamped leg-
islation that would predicate an unavailable child witness’s statements). 
 73. See Cynthia J. Hennings, Accommodating Child Abuse Victims: Spe-
cial Hearsay Exceptions in Sexual Offense Prosecutions, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
663, 672 n.57 (listing statutes adopted by twenty-four states to ensure the re-
liability of child statements in child sex abuse cases). 
 74. At that time, some statutes required corroborating evidence before the 
admission of hearsay. See Nora A. Uehlein, Annotation, Witnesses: Child 
Competency Statutes, 60 A.L.R. 4th 369, 468 (1988). 
 75. See Lynn McLain, Children are Losing Maryland’s “Tender Years” 
War, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 21, 29 (1997) (noting that one difficulty in prosecu-
tion is that the abused children are often the only witnesses); Erin Thompson, 
Comment, Child Sex Abuse Victims: How Will Their Stories Be Heard After 
Crawford v. Washington?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 279, 290 (2005) (“The prosecu-
tion of child sex crimes becomes increasingly difficult because young children 
lose memory, traumatized children block memory, and victims blame them-
selves.”). 
 76. See, e.g., McLain, supra note 75, at 28 (discussing the reticence or in-
timidation an abused child might feel before coming forward). 
 77. The country’s leading child advocacy center was established in 1985 
by a district attorney in Huntsville, Alabama. See NCAC, History, supra note 
71. 
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tors, social workers, nurses and physicians attempt to holisti-
cally tackle cases.78 Today, over six hundred child advocacy 
centers are operating in the United States—at least one in 
every state.79 
Child advocacy centers follow a model that is structured to 
minimize trauma for children alleging abuse.80 Many advocacy 
centers emphasize that their primary goal is to serve the needs 
of children,81 which is obvious in the centers’ brightly painted 
walls, baskets of dolls, and shelves of therapeutic coloring 
books.82 The ambiance, however, does not dilute the centers’ 
other purpose: to produce and preserve evidence for the prose-
cution of the alleged offenders.83 
Child advocacy centers conduct forensic interviews which 
use open-ended and developmentally appropriate questioning 
techniques.84 The rooms are generally equipped with cameras 
or two-way mirrors that allow an investigative team to monitor 
and record the interviews.85 After the interview, the child 
usually undergoes a medical examination performed by a phy-
 
 78. See id.; CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18 (ex-
plaining the coordinated efforts of law enforcement, child protection and pros-
ecutors in assessing and investigating allegations of child abuse). 
 79. See NCAC, History, supra note 71 (stating that child abuse profes-
sionals from all fifty states have been trained by NCAC). 
 80. See id. Many child advocacy centers follow a “RATAC” protocol. See, 
e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18. The RATAC 
protocol stands for rapport, anatomy identification, touch inquiry, abuse sce-
nario, and closure. For a more detailed look at the protocol, see AM. PROSECU-
TOR RES. INST., FINDING WORDS: HALF A NATION BY 2010, at 2, 5–7 (2003), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/finding_words_2003.pdf. 
 81. See, e.g., Alan Riquelmy & Lily Gordon, Local Authorities Team Up to 
Fight Child Sex Crimes, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, June 10, 2007 (“‘The 
primary purpose of the child advocacy center is to see the needs of a child are 
always put first . . . .’” (quoting child advocate Angela Crabtree)). 
 82. See CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18. 
 83. See, e.g., NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18 (stating that a benefit 
to child advocacy centers is “increased successful prosecutions”). 
 84. See Emily Gurnon, New Ways of Interviewing Lessen Trauma for 
Children: Past Errors Have Helped Improve Techniques to Detect Sexual 
Abuse, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 22, 2007, at A1; CornerHouse, Forensic 
Interview Services, supra note 18; NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18. 
 85. See Sarah Mishkin, Trauma Eased Through Efficiency, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, July 27, 2007, at 1 (reporting that an investigative team of police, 
child protection services, and a guardian ad litem monitor interviews through 
closed-circuit television); Riquelmy & Gordon, supra note 81 (reporting that 
interview rooms at a Georgia child advocacy center have hidden cameras mo-
nitored by “a district attorney, a police officer and a Georgia Department of 
Family and Children’s Services worker”). 
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sician or nurse.86 If the investigation produces enough evidence 
to build a case, prosecutors will use the evidence at trial.87 The 
forensic interviewer and medical examiner will testify to the in-
formation gathered during the interview and examination and 
the videotaped interview may be entered into evidence.88 
C.  STATE COURTS RESPOND: CHILD ADVOCACY INTERVIEWS AND 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS AFTER CRAWFORD AND DAVIS 
Clearly, the importance of prosecuting child abusers is 
deeply felt in society. Hundreds of thousands of children are 
sexually abused each year.89 Sexually abused children suffer 
from anxiety and depression, and are at a greater risk of engag-
ing in alcohol or drug abuse as adults.90 For more than twenty 
years, child advocacy centers have collected children’s state-
ments and put them before juries. It is no wonder that there 
may be a “general reticence” to find a child’s statements testi-
monial.91 
After Crawford and Davis, states have focused their testi-
monial inquiries on the so-called primary purpose of the inves-
tigation that generates the challenged statements:92 if the pri-
mary purpose of the interviews is not prosecutorial, then a 
child’s statements are not testimonial.93 Since joint investiga-
 
 86. See, e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Medical Examinations, http://www 
.cornerhousemn.org/medicalexams.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
 87. See, e.g., Riquelmy & Gordon, supra note 81 (noting that interviews at 
a child advocacy center enable law enforcement, the district attorney, and oth-
er agencies to form a “team” that helps build a case and bring it to trial). 
 88. For examples of this occurrence, see State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 
643 (Minn. 2007); Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255–56 (Minn. 2006). See also 
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 606 (2005) (discussing the 
practice of eliciting testimony from doctors). Some states have, however, ruled 
that this violates defendants’ confrontation rights. See, e.g., State v. Hender-
son, 160 P.3d 776, 782 (Kan. 2007) (finding that a trial court’s admission of a 
videotaped interview of a three-year-old accuser violated the Confrontation 
Clause). 
 89. The exact numbers are difficult to compute because of victim recanta-
tions and unreported incidents. The National Children’s Advocacy Center, 
however, estimates that it helps more than 250,000 children annually. NCAC, 
History, supra note 71. 
 90. See Thompson, supra note 75. 
 91. Mosteller, supra note 8, at 978. 
 92. See Henderson, 160 P.3d at 787 (discussing the primary purpose of a 
videotaped interview); Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 641 (arguing that the primary 
purpose of a forensic interview of an alleged child sexual abuse victim is to en-
sure the general welfare of the child). 
 93. See Henderson, 160 P.3d at 787; Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 641. 
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tions statutes were created to protect children, Minnesota, for 
example, found in State v. Krasky that the primary purpose of 
the interview conducted pursuant to the joint investigation sta-
tute was to ensure the child’s welfare and so the court admitted 
the statements from the interview as nontestimonial.94 But 
other courts have rejected this argument.95 
Krasky involved a child’s videotaped statements made at a 
child advocacy center.96 The Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that the statements were admissible as nontestimonial hear-
say, even though the last contact the alleged victim had with 
the defendant was eighteen months before the interview.97 The 
state considered it “significant” that the interview was con-
ducted “in accord with a statutory scheme”98 that was enacted 
to protect the health and welfare of children.99 Disregarding the 
fact that the interview had taken place at the behest of law en-
forcement and was conducted and videotaped in the presence of 
police officers, the court found that the actual purpose of the in-
terview was to ensure child welfare. According to the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court, this was because child advocacy centers help 
to protect a child’s health and safety.100 The court thus rea-
soned that under Crawford and Davis, statements produced at 
the advocacy center could not violate the defendant’s confronta-
tion rights because the primary purpose of the interview is to 
protect a child’s welfare, not to put a predator behind bars.101 
Kansas and Missouri, on the other hand, determined that 
statements resulting from such interviews are testimonial.102 
As in Krasky, the interviews took place some time after the al-
leged events and the statements were videotaped in front of law 
enforcement officers.103 Following the standard confrontation 
framework, the totality of circumstances—including the formal-
ity of the interview and level of government involvement—
showed that while the safety of the child was a concern, the 
 
 94. 736 N.W.2d at 641–42. 
 95. See Henderson, 160 P.3d at 782–92; State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 
316 (Md. 2005). 
 96. 736 N.W.2d at 638–39. 
 97. Id. at 638 & n.1. 
 98. Id. at 641 (quoting Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2006)). 
 99. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subdivs. 1, 10(a) (2006). 
 100. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d at 641. 
 101. Id. 
 102. State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 792 (Kan. 2007); State v. Justus, 
205 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Mo. 2006). 
 103. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 778–79, 789; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881. 
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main effect of the investigation was to elicit the child’s testimo-
ny, just as a prosecutor would from a standing witness.104 Be-
cause no cross-examination of the accuser occurred at the cen-
ter, the court found that the statements must be barred from 
evidence when the child is incompetent to testify.105 
These cases exemplify the problem with Davis’s primary 
purpose test. Facing similar facts, state courts have remarka-
bly arrived at opposite conclusions regarding a defendant’s con-
stitutional right. This is because child advocacy centers have 
many missions: promoting a child’s health and welfare, secur-
ing the child’s safety, and gathering evidence to be used in 
prosecution. No one mission is above the rest, but as argued be-
low, this should not erode certain testimonial aspects of the 
child advocacy interviews. 
II.  NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR MANY PURPOSES,  
CHILD ADVOCACY CENTERS PRODUCE  
TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY   
The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimoni-
al hearsay where there was no opportunity to cross-examine 
those statements. Because there are prosecutorial purposes to 
the forensic interviews at child advocacy centers, and because 
they are not conducted during an emergency, a child’s state-
ments during such interviews should be scrutinized to deter-
mine whether they are testimonial. The extent of direct gov-
ernment involvement in the questioning, the monetary 
prosecutorial incentives, and the lack of adversarial-like testing 
are factors in determining whether these statements are testi-
monial, irrespective of the multiple purposes of the forensic in-
terviews conducted at child advocacy centers. 
A. THE MANY MISSIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY CENTERS, 
INCLUDING PROSECUTION 
The National Children’s Advocacy Center—a model child 
advocacy center which trains other child advocacy specialists—
defines child advocacy centers as “child-focused, community-
oriented, facility-based program[s] in which representatives 
from many disciplines meet to discuss and make decisions 
about investigation, treatment and prosecution of child abuse 
 
 104. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 790; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880–81. 
 105. Henderson, 160 P.3d at 792; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881. 
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cases.”106 It identifies four main objectives for the forensic eval-
uation of a child. The first objective is to determine “the likelih-
ood of abuse.”107 The second is to “gather . . . facts necessary for 
child protection and law enforcement . . . .”108 The third is to al-
low a child to recount his story in a “non-threatening environ-
ment.”109 And the fourth is “to make treatment recommenda-
tions.”110 Child welfare is integral to child advocacy centers by 
both providing “needed mental health treatment and other ser-
vices to children and families” and “coordinating and tracking 
investigative, prosecutorial, child protection and treatment ef-
forts” so that sexually abused children are not forgotten.111 
1.  The Psychological and Medical Purposes 
Unlike many adult victims, abused children need other 
people to assess their situation to make sure they are no longer 
in harm’s way, and child advocacy centers attempt to provide 
this service.112 Interviewers inquire into whether the child is 
still in contact with the person who is hurting him.113 Ques-
tions about the past events assist the doctors in alleviating the 
current medical condition of the child.114 
The benefits of the child advocacy model are apparent 
when considering the hysteria that can surround child sexual 
abuse cases. In the 1980s, there was an increase in the number 
of child sexual abuse cases, particularly involving child-
molestation rings.115 The lure of capturing sexual predators 
 
 106. The National Children’s Advocacy Center, What Is a Child Advocacy 
Center?, http://www.nationalcac.org/ncac/what_is_cac.html (last visited Dec. 1, 
2008). 
 107. The National Children’s Advocacy Center, Extended Forensic Evalua-
tions, http://www.nationalcac.org/professionals/model/forensic_eval.html (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. E.g., NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18. 
 112. See, e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18 
(describing a local child advocacy center’s mission as trying “to maintain the 
highest quality intervention system for children alleged to be victims of abuse 
and violence”). 
 113. See Mosteller, supra note 8, at 951, 953–54. 
 114. Id. at 951. 
 115. Lola Vollen & Dave Eggers, A Culture of Fear: A Series of Child Abuse 
Cases in the Mid-1980s Caused Mass Hysteria, in SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERI-
CA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 186 (Vollen & Eggers eds., 
2005). 
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caused some prosecutors to pursue cases that “def[ied] logic.”116 
Upon repeated questioning by prosecutors, social workers, and 
law enforcement, uncorroborated stories of sexual abuse devel-
oped into tales of satanic killings, cannibalism, and never-to-be-
found underground tunnels and castles.117 
At that time, little had been studied about child suscepti-
bility to false memories and many coercive interview tech-
niques led to predator “witch hunts.”118 The McMartin Pre-
school case is one such example. The case involved several 
defendants, took over six years, and cost more than $15 mil-
lion.119 The accused parties spent a total of nine years behind 
bars while facing “patently absurd” charges120 involving 
witches, warlocks, and satanic rituals.121 Other cases include 
the Wee-Care Nursery School teacher, Kelly Michaels, who ac-
cording to her child-accusers forced students to eat excre-
ment,122 and Dale Akiki, a disfigured Sunday school teacher, 
who children claimed had killed animals and drank their blood 
before engaging in sex rituals.123 In Jordan, Minnesota, one 
prosecutor charged twenty-four people with molesting thirty-
seven children who had alleged that the adults had orgies with 
them during which children were stabbed, shot, and be-
headed.124 None of these charges, it turns out, were true.125 
 
 116. Jonathan Kaminsky, Devil’s Advocate: What Would a Lawyer Do to 
Clear His Client of Child Sexual Abuse Charges?, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis, 
Minn.), July 11, 2007, at 15. 
 117. See, e.g., TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE DEVAS-
TATING EFFECT OF FALSE SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS 4–14 (1998) (detailing the 
charges of various sexual abuse cases). 
 118. See John Stoll, If a Five-Year-Old Says You Did It, You Did It, in SUR-
VIVING JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 179–85; Jacob V. Lamar, Jr. & J. Madeline 
Nash, Disturbing End of a Nightmare, TIME, Feb. 25, 1985, at 22 (describing a 
case from Jordan, Minnesota where twenty-four adults were charged with mo-
lesting thirty-seven children as a “witch-hunt”). 
 119. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4. 
 120. Id. 
 121. PAUL EBERLE & SHIRLEY EBERLE, THE ABUSE OF INNOCENCE: THE 
MCMARTIN PRESCHOOL TRIAL 20, 27–28 (1993). 
 122. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 14. 
 123. Frontline, Innocence Lost the Plea: Other Well-Known Cases, http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/innocence/etc/other.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008). 
 124. No children, however, were ever reported missing and no bodies were 
ever found. Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 15. 
 125. Five of the seven defendants in the McMartin Preschool case were 
found not guilty, and the jury could not reach a unanimous decision for the 
remaining two defendants. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4. Dale Akiki was 
acquitted on all charges and later brought suit against prosecutors for libel 
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How could this happen? By the time any of these children 
actually testified at trial they had repeatedly met with social 
workers, therapists, police, prosecutors, and doctors, and the 
stories they ultimately presented were not their own.126 Inter-
viewers often used suggestive questions127 and many of the 
meetings were undocumented, providing no opportunity to 
check their veracity.128 While some defendants were acquit-
ted,129 exonerated,130 or had their cases dismissed131 the 
 
and emotional distress. Frontline, supra note 123. Kelly Michaels’s conviction 
was overturned eight years after the case’s inception. CAMPBELL, supra note 
117, at 19. As for the cases in Jordan, Minnesota, one defendant pleaded 
guilty, two were acquitted, and the remaining twenty-one charges were volun-
tarily dropped. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868–69 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). An investigation by the Minnesota Attorney General found no credi-
ble evidence to substantiate the allegations. Id. 
 126. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 869; CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 64–80 (dis-
cussing coercive interview techniques and the results of repetitive meetings); 
Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18. 
 127. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 64–68 (providing extensive ex-
amples of the various way questioners repetitively assumed conclusions dur-
ing forensic interviews, despite children refuting them). Interviewers not only 
used leading questions, but they often disregarded indications that a child had 
not been abused. Id. During one interview for the Kelly Michaels case, the in-
terviewer proceeded as follows: 
Interviewer: Did Kelly have public [sic] hair? 
Child: Nah, I know cause it’s grown ups . . . I know about that. 
Interviewer: So I guess that means you saw her private parts, huh? 
Did Kelly ask the kids to look at her private parts, or to kiss her pri-
vate part or… 
Child: I didn’t really do that. . . I didn’t even do it. 
Interviewer: But she made you. 
Child: She made me. She made me . . . But I couldn’t do it . . . So I 
didn’t really do it. I didn’t do it. 
Interviewer: Did it smell good? 
Child: Shhh. 
Interviewer: Her private parts? 
Child: I don’t know. 
Interviewer: Did it taste good? Did it taste like chocolate? 
Id. at 64–65. 
 128. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 123. 
 129. CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4 (noting the acquittal of the McMartin 
defendants). 
 130. See, e.g., Stoll, supra note 118, at 197–99 (providing an essay of a man 
who spent nineteen years in prison before being exonerated of molesting his 
son and other children). 
 131. See, e.g., Minnesota Says Abuse Case Was Improperly Conducted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1985, at A16 (noting that child sexual abuse charges against 
twenty-one defendants had been dropped in light of prosecutorial misconduct). 
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charges brought against them were at an irreparable cost to the 
state and their individual lives.132 
Child advocacy centers purport to have corrected certain 
problems that occurred in these situations.133 Training sessions 
teach multidisciplinary teams the fundamentals of child devel-
opment, suggestibility, and corroborating a child’s story.134 In-
stead of routing the child through interviews with the police, 
then the social worker, then the psychologist, and then again 
with a police officer, the child may go to one place where he 
feels safe and protected.135 The interviewer is supposed to ask 
nonleading questions, and a video camera is to capture the al-
leged victim’s testimony closer to the time of the event in ques-
tion than the trial, thus minimizing the possibility of exagge-
rated stories.136 While this format resolves some of the concerns 
about false accusations, today’s child advocacy centers still 
have many flaws. The most notable are the lack of adversarial 
testing of the child alleging abuse and the very strong prosecu-
torial ties to the centers. 
2.  The Prosecutorial Purpose 
Regardless of other goals, child advocacy centers have a 
clear prosecutorial purpose. Davis expressed a specific concern 
over the involvement of “government officers” in an interview 
because of the potential for prosecutorial abuse,137 which had 
already been well documented in child sexual abuse cases like 
the McMartin Preschool case.138 While the scope of the defini-
 
 132. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 4 (detailing the cost of the 
McMartin case). False accusations also have damaging effects on children. See, 
e.g., Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 19, 2004, at 78. 
One boy, who accused his mother of abuse, wrote in a poem: “She didn’t do it. I 
was forced to lie. Here I go to cry, cry, cry.” Id. at 80. 
 133. See Gurnon, supra note 84; Childhelp, Advocacy Centers, http:// 
www.childhelp.org/about/programs-and-services/childhelp-national-child-
abuse-hotline-1-800-4-a-child/advocacy-centers (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (list-
ing child advocacy centers’ advantages). 
 134. AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80. 
 135. See, e.g., Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006) (“Avoiding 
multiple interviews is a critical concern when dealing with children not only 
because the interviews are often traumatic for the child, but also because mul-
tiple interviews increase the chance that the children will be confused by un-
necessarily suggestive questions.”). 
 136. See Gurnon, supra note 84; Childhelp, Advocacy Centers, supra note 
133. 
 137. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006). 
 138. See CAMPBELL, supra note 117; Vollen & Eggers, supra note 115; CAP-
TURING THE FRIEDMANS (HBO Documentary 2003) (documenting one family’s 
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tion of a government officer was once seemingly limited to law 
enforcement, perhaps excluding child advocacy interviewers 
from the prosecutorial analysis, Davis noted that a 911 opera-
tor was, at the very least, an “agent[] of law enforcement”139 
and her questioning was indistinguishable from police interro-
gations for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.140 
Similarly, while the interviewers at child advocacy centers 
are usually specially trained nurses, social workers, or physi-
cians—not police officers or 911 operators141—forensic work is 
integral to their jobs.142 Though they do not wear badges, the 
interviewers are acting on behalf of the prosecuting govern-
ment.143 Child advocacy centers have even received monetary 
incentives to prosecute alleged abusers.144 The Department of 
Justice and local prosecutors’ offices give large grants to cen-
ters, sometimes totaling millions of dollars.145 
More important, the questions in the interviews are pur-
posely structured to elicit the child’s accusatory statements.146 
In order to “help prosecutors build stronger cases and put more 
abusers behind bars,” the centers have streamlined evidence-
gathering, and prosecutors or police may have an immediate 
say in how the interview is conducted.147 Videotaped recordings 
 
journey through sexual abuse charges); Frontline: Innocence Lost the Plea 
(PBS television broadcast May 27, 1997). 
 139. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2. 
 140. Id. at 838. 
 141. See Gurnon, supra note 84; Childhelp, Advocacy Centers, supra note 
133; CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18. 
 142. See AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80; CornerHouse, Foren-
sic Interview Services, supra note 18. Even if interviewers and examiners are 
not government agents, the Court has suggested that statements may be tes-
timonial if they are made to “neutral” parties. As Crawford noted, the framers 
would have been “astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be admit-
ted . . . because it was elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers.” Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004). 
 143. See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 326 (Md. 2005) (noting that the 
social worker’s role as the interviewer was “little different from the role of a 
police officer in a routine police interrogation”); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 
352 (Or. 2004) (finding that a social worker was serving as a “proxy for the po-
lice”). 
 144. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 16. 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 18 (noting that grants from the Department of Justice 
have given one child advocacy center $1.7 million since 1999). 
 146. See, e.g., AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80; CornerHouse, 
Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18 (describing Cornerhouse Intera-
gency Child Abuse Evaluation and Training Center’s processes for assessing 
and investigating reported instances of child abuse). 
 147. Mishkin, supra note 85 (quoting a child advocacy center social work-
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are either shown to juries, or they may be used to help prosecu-
tors in their investigations. 
By acting on police referrals, providing prosecution with 
collected evidence, and in receiving financial support from the 
same coffers as prosecutors, child advocacy centers have a pro-
secutorial nature.148 The reality that forensic interviews may 
have multiple purposes cannot simply expunge the prosecutori-
al force behind the centers. A medical examination purpose, or 
safety purpose or psychological purpose is simply not a “talis-
man for a nontestimonial determination,”149 but neither does 
the prosecutorial nature obliterate the centers’ other vital 
tasks. 
B.  A TESTIMONIAL INDICATION: THE NONEMERGENCY 
SITUATION 
As required by Davis, in order for statements to be testi-
monial, not only must they have a prosecutorial purpose, but 
the circumstances must objectively indicate that there is not an 
ongoing emergency. While Davis “muddies its analysis in a 
footnote”150 which declares that the Confrontation Clause con-
cerns a declarant’s expectation in making the statement,151 the 
objective purpose of statements from a child’s perspective 
would be fruitless, if not impossible to determine, because 
children may lack capacity to understand the consequences of 
their statements.152 State courts seem to agree that the objec-
 
er). 
 148. See T.P. v. State, 911 So.2d 1117, 1123 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (finding 
that because the child’s statements arose out of an interview with social work-
ers and police officer working as a criminal investigation team, the interview 
was similar to a police investigation); Mack, 101 P.3d at 352 (finding that the 
caseworker conducting the interview “was serving as a proxy for the police”). 
But see State v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 923–24 (Colo. 2006) (“The fact that the 
doctor was a member of a child protection team does not, in and of itself, make 
him a government official absent a more direct and controlling police presence 
. . . .”). 
 149. Mosteller, supra note 8, at 957. Many courts have also agreed. See 
United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 555–59 (8th Cir. 2005) (addressing 
the issues inherent to “forensic interviews” with respect to the Confrontation 
Clause); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 320–33 (Md. 2005) (discussing the 
admissibility of ex parte testimony); Mack, 101 P.3d at 349 (determining the 
question of whether statements made by a child to a Department of Human 
Services caseworker were admissible). 
 150. Raeder, supra note 62, at 1012–13. 
 151. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006). 
 152. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 62, at 1012 (discussing the viability of an 
assumption that “the stress of the event . . . defeat[s] the [child’s] ability to 
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tive purpose of the interviews counts for Sixth Amendment 
analysis.153 At most, a victim’s awareness that his statements 
would later be used to prosecute the alleged perpetrator should 
be “but one factor” for courts to consider in light of Davis and 
Crawford.154 
Analyzing the centers from an objective-observer point of 
view instead, one can see that the forensic interviewers are typ-
ically not questioning children in response to an ongoing emer-
gency. Child advocacy centers are not in emergency rooms—
they are separate from hospitals and police stations; and most 
of the interviews are conducted at least several hours, if not 
years, after the alleged abuse.155 Children are likely very far 
away from their alleged abuser, and many interviewers engage 
the child by using forensic dolls or children’s books before the 
interview so that the child is not only calm, but comfortable.156 
To compare, the Supreme Court found that the victim in Ham-
mon made testimonial statements in a nonemergency situation 
where she was in a separate room from the defendant—but in 
the same house—and where the 911 call had been placed only 
four minutes prior to her statements.157 
The circumstances most commonly associated with inter-
views at child advocacy centers indicate that the statements 
from those interviews are made under nonemergency condi-
tions. While it may be true that child sexual abuse is an omni-
present emergency—that society’s sirens should sound so long 
as predators are loose—so is the notion that a defendant’s con-
stitutional right to confrontation is being violated. 
 
lie”). 
 153. See State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233 (Idaho Ct. App. 
Aug. 11 2006); Snowden, 867 A.2d at 324; Mosteller, supra note 8, at 984 (“The 
primary focus in Crawford was on the method by which government officials 
elicited out-of-court statements for use in criminal trials, not on the decla-
rant’s intent or purpose in making the statement.”); Raeder, supra note 62, at 
1012 (“I believe the Supreme Court, like the majority of appellate courts, 
would reject interpreting the objective observer standard from the perspective 
of a child of similar age.”). 
 154. State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 785 (Kan. 2007). 
 155. For example, the interview in State v. Krasky occurred eighteen 
months after any possible contact with the defendant. 736 N.W.2d 636, 638 
n.1 (Minn. 2007). The interview in Henderson was a few weeks afterwards. 
Henderson, 160 P.3d at 778. 
 156. See, e.g., AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80 (discussing the 
program’s various interviewing procedures); CornerHouse, Forensic Interview 
Services, supra note 18. 
 157. Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006). 
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C.  CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PRODUCE TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY: 
PROSECUTORIAL CONNECTIONS AND NO ADVERSARIAL TESTING 
Finally, despite child advocacy centers’ many purposes, 
certain circumstances make the statements from their forensic 
interviews testimonial. As established, these interviews do 
have prosecutorial goals and they are conducted in non-
emergency situations. When prosecutors and police are directly 
involved in questioning the child, when there is monetary in-
centive to prosecute, or when there is no adversarial-like test-
ing of the child, the function of the interviews turns primarily 
prosecutorial, and the statements become testimonial. 
1.  A Prosecutorial Examination 
As previously discussed, the right to confrontation arose 
out of anxiety over ex parte examinations which could implicate 
defendants without affording the opportunity to cross-examine 
the accusers. Child advocacy interviews can resemble ex parte 
hearings because of heavy prosecutorial involvement. Many 
joint investigation statutes require interviewers to work with 
police officers and prosecutors,158 and interviewers sometimes 
meet with the prosecution team even before meeting the 
child.159 Similarly, because officers are often notified of alleged 
abuse before the child advocacy centers, they refer victims and 
their families to the centers, and sometimes even drive them 
there.160 The interviewer may only then be briefed on the case 
by the officer or given a police report.161 
During the interview, police officers and prosecutors can 
monitor the child’s statements and directly manipulate the in-
terview.162 Prosecutors and police may be in the interview 
 
 158. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006) (requiring interagency coordina-
tion); State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (dis-
cussing how child advocacy workers are “charged with taking action, using 
court proceedings, to protect the best interests of the child” and must report all 
suspected abuse to the county prosecutor (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6–8.36a 
(2006); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:129-1 (2006))). 
 159. See State v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 935–36 (Colo. 2006) (retelling how, 
before the doctor conducted the forensic exam, an officer spoke with him about 
the background of her sexual assault investigation); Buda, 912 A.2d at 743 
(noting that a child-advocacy worker talked with the prosecutor’s investigator 
before interviewing a child). 
 160. Vigil, 127 P.3d at 935–36. 
 161. See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 326 (Md. 2005). 
 162. For examples of this occurrence, see State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 
787 (Kan. 2007); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 349–50 (Or. 2004) (discussing 
the presence of law enforcement during the forensic interview). 
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room, as was the case for Bobadilla,163 or they may watch from 
behind a two-way mirror164 or via closed-circuit television.165 
After asking initial questions, interviewers may leave the meet-
ing, consult with the prosecutor, and then return to the child 
for more questioning in case the prosecutor thinks something 
was missed.166 Though there is an intermediary person be-
tween the prosecutor’s question and the victim in this situation, 
it is as if the direct examination of the accuser has begun, but 
no one invited the defendant, or the jurors. By directly involv-
ing prosecutors in eliciting a child’s testimony, the multiple 
purposes of the interview fade into a primary prosecutorial 
function, causing the statements to become testimonial. Prose-
cutors, after all, can only protect a child’s health or safety by 
locking up the alleged abuser. 
2.  The Lack of Adversarial Testing 
Crawford and Davis expressed concern with interviews 
that were “weaker substitute[s]” for live testimony because the 
Confrontation Clause demands that the accused be able to test 
the veracity of his accuser’s statements.167 Child advocacy in-
terviews appear to fall into this category. Although the inter-
views are formal, as with any trial examination, there is little 
to no investigation into the truth of the allegations. 
Child advocacy interviews follow a protocol to “ascertain[] 
whether abuse [has] occurred.”168 Despite attempts to “steer[] 
clear of leading questions,”169 investigative inquiries establish a 
background story.170 In State v. Justus,171 for example, the in-
terviewer “reminded [the victim] that she had said earlier that 
she did not like her daddy and that he had kissed her ‘pee-
 
 163. Bobadilla III, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 164. See, e.g., In Re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 165. Mishkin, supra note 85. 
 166. See, e.g., Gurnon, supra note 84 (describing how an observer, such as a 
police officer, “can call the interviewer from the adjoining room to ask . . . 
another line of questioning”). 
 167. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (citing United States v. 
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). 
 168. Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Minn. 2006). 
 169. Kaminsky, supra note 116. 
 170. See Bobadilla II, 709 N.W.2d at 247 (noting that the child-protection 
worker began the interview that was meant to be open-ended by asking “[h]as 
anybody hurt your body” and reaffirming the child’s answer when he named 
the perpetrator). 
 171. 205 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo. 2006). 
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pee’”—though there was no verifiable evidence that the child 
had, in fact, made that statement.172 
Even if questions are not leading, “the Framers were no 
more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered 
testimony or answers to open-ended questions” than they were 
a structured interview.173 Thus a child’s statements still mimic 
testimony at trial—except for the fatal fact that these state-
ments may never be cross-examined or questioned. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity of cross-
examination in order to “tease out the truth” for trial.174 And 
arguably, there is a greater need for cross-examination when 
the witness is a child. The susceptibility of children has been a 
long-standing concern in these types of cases.175 Although the 
centers attempt to minimize the number of interviews a child 
must endure, prosecutors, psychologists, and parents still may 
meet with the child to rehearse his story many times.176 Par-
ents, for example, have admitted to “relentlessly questioning 
their children until they finally gave sway and admitted to [be-
ing] abuse[d].”177 One mother of an alleged victim admitted 
that she repeatedly tried to get her child to say that he had 
 
 172. Id. at 876. 
 173. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 n.1 (2006). 
 174. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004). 
 175. See generally JOHN DORIS, THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RE-
COLLECTIONS (1991) (providing a detailed study of child suggestibility). Some 
say the evidence is inconclusive. John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions: 
Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 3, 29–32 (2002). But even adult memory has been proven to be fallible; 
just consider the many cases of false confessions. See Beverly Monroe, Now I 
Question Everything, in SURVIVING JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 203–18 (recal-
ling the horror and confusion of falsely implicating herself ); Opinion, Justice 
in the Central Park Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at A22 (detailing 
the case in which five teenagers confessed to brutally raping a woman, noting 
that false confessions are common, particularly under “intense interroga-
tions”); Innocence Project, False Confessions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting that 25% 
of DNA-exoneration cases involved false confessions). 
 176. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18 (discussing how a victim 
met ten to fifteen times with the prosecutor, and at least once before his inter-
view at the child advocacy center). Needless to say, there are no notes or re-
cordings from these interviews. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, 
JEOPARDY IN THE COURT ROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TES-
TIMONY 161 (1995). 
 177. Frontline: Innocence Lost the Plea, supra note 138. One mother said 
that while she repeatedly tried to get her child to say that he had been abused: 
“It was ‘no’ the majority of the time . . . most of the time he didn’t know what I 
was talking about.” Id. But ultimately the mother told police only that her son 
said that he was abused. Id. 
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been abused, even though the child adamantly denied it all but 
once.178 By the time she got to police, however, she only told 
them that her son had admitted to being abused, and police fol-
lowed her lead.179 
Moreover, when children are actually abused, they may 
seek help but falsely accuse someone other than the true ab-
user “[i]n order to protect the family member but also get out of 
the situation.”180 While child advocacy centers are designed to 
reduce false accusations and minimize trauma to the child who 
braves coming forward, the value of some of their techniques is 
questionable.181 Using dolls can be perceived as playing pre-
tend—deemphasizing the importance of telling the truth—and 
books can be suggestive, especially if repeatedly read.182 
Child advocacy interviewers do little to address these prob-
lems. As noted, the centers can receive money from law en-
forcement once they determine that a child was sexually 
abused, but they collect nothing if they do not find evidence of 
abuse.183 This monetary motivation makes it questionable 
whether the centers ever investigate alternative theories to the 
child’s stories or inquire into the weaknesses of the claims.184 
In fact, it seems interviewers may not ask some of the most ba-
sic questions to check the reliability of the accusations.185 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18. 
 181. CECI & BRUCK, supra note 176, at 184 (“Simply put, we conclude that 
there is no available scientific evidence that supports the clinical or forensic 
diagnosis of abuse made primarily on the basis of a very young child’s interac-
tion with anatomical dolls . . . .”). 
 182. Id.; CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 61–84 (discussing the benefits and 
potential consequences of different interviewing strategies). 
 183. See Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18. 
 184. Id. (discussing the financial incentive for the center to find abuse). 
 185. The RATAC Protocol, for example, does not require checking reliabili-
ty of the child’s statements. AM. PROSECUTOR RES. INST., supra note 80, at 2. 
Though child advocates are trained to find corroboration in order to increase 
chances for successful prosecution, id. at 7, minimal corroboration usually 
comes from police officers or parents who may have their own incentives. See, 
e.g., Frontline, Innocence Lost the Plea: Excerpt on Repeated Questioning, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/innocence/readings/repeated 
.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (documenting the progression of a child’s 
story after multiple interrogation sessions with his mother). Children can ac-
cuse the wrong family member of sexual abuse in order to get help. Kaminsky, 
supra note 116. If the actual perpetrator is the parent, such corroboration is 
useless. 
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According to one director, “the objective of the interview . . . 
is to collect salient details from reticent children,”186 but “it is 
not [the] clinic’s role . . . to establish who else has talked to the 
child, or whether the child may have been encouraged to fabri-
cate allegations.”187 Indeed, unsupported stories like those in 
the McMartin Preschool case have continued to occur, despite 
the existence of these centers.188 Critics argue that the centers 
actually fuel false memories by unconditionally encouraging 
children to talk, rewarding them for doing so, and using ana-
tomical dolls and suggestive children’s books beforehand.189 
While some courts argue that the centers’ child-centric ap-
proach magically minimizes the level of formality to the inter-
view,190 as Maryland noted, “[s]tatements in response to struc-
tured police interrogation are no less testimonial because the 
police interrogator expresses empathy or friendship for the in-
terviewee.”191 By extension, statements made to concerned 
child advocates are still subject to testimonial scrutiny.192 
When the structured formality of the interviews elicits res-
ponses from a child that resonates of testimony a witness would 
give on the stand, without the benefit of any independent in-
vestigation into the statement’s veracity, the child’s statements 
become “inherently testimonial.”193 The fact that the interroga-
tion room has dolls and coloring books does not alter the for-
 
 186. Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 16. 
 187. Id. at 22. 
 188. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 123 (detailing many other tragic cases 
occurring after the advent of child advocacy centers, even where children were 
interviewed by therapists “specializing in diagnosing sexual abuse”). 
 189. CECI & BRUCK, supra note 176; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 
86–92 (showing a case study of how the use of dolls and repeated questions 
can be coercive). 
 190. See State v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 921–26 (Colo. 2006) (finding that the 
interview did not rise to the formality of an interrogation); Bobadilla II, 709 
N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006) (finding that the interviewer’s purpose was to 
care for the child and not to gather a statement for trial). 
 191. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 328 (Md. 2005). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006); see also State v. Hoo-
per, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *5 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2006); State 
v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 789–90 (Kan. 2007); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 
872, 877–81 (Mo. 2006) (holding that statements were testimonial because 
they were not made “in the midst of an ongoing emergency”); State v. Blue, 
717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006) (holding that the child claimant’s video-taped fo-
rensic interview was a formal statement); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 
2004). 
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mality of the interview, nor the Confrontation Clause analy-
sis.194 
In the end, child advocacy centers admirably attempt to 
make child victims’ voices heard in the courtroom while pro-
tecting the children’s medical health and psychological well-
being. The statements children make during forensic inter-
views, however, can be testimonial regardless of the multiple 
purposes of child advocacy centers. The prosecutorial nature 
during some interviews parallels the civil law abuses that the 
Founders intended to avoid—prosecutors should not be directly 
involved in questioning the alleged victim, interviewers should 
not be paid according to prosecution rates, and police, prosecu-
tors and child advocacy interviewers should subject the child’s 
statements to some type of truth verification. 
III.  TESTIMONIAL PRESUMPTIONS:  
HELPING JUDGES DETERMINE THE PURPOSE  
OF CHILD ADVOCACY INTERVIEWS   
As it currently exists, the primary-purpose test of Davis is 
insufficient to resolve the issue of whether child advocacy cen-
ter interviews are testimonial or nontestimonial. It allows 
courts to evade the real issues that make statements testi-
monial when an interview may have multiple purposes. The 
primary purpose test should not only take into consideration 
Crawford circumstances—that is, the level of formality of an 
interview, and the involvement of government agents195—but it 
should expand to include presumptions that certain statements 
are testimonial. Statements should be presumptively testi-
monial if police or prosecutors have been directly involved with 
child advocacy centers, or if there was no alternative-theory 
testing of a child’s story. Because these circumstances may not 
always exist during the interviews, this solution provides an 
important safety-valve for admitting statements that are non-
testimonial. The state can overcome these presumptions pro-
vided they prove certain facts delineated below. 
 
 194. See Snowden, 867 A.2d at 327–28, (noting that even though the inter-
view room “[bore] little resemblance to the torture chambers,” the child advo-
cacy center’s “express purpose . . . was to provide a controlled and structured 
environment for the questioning, or interrogation, of the children about their 
accounts of a possible crime”). 
 195. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also Davis, 547 
U.S. at 820–30. 
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A.  PRESUMPTION ONE: DIRECT PROSECUTORIAL INVOLVEMENT 
While purportedly prioritizing the child’s health and wel-
fare,196 as argued above, the centers often operate as satellite 
offices for law enforcement, and the forensic interviews mimic 
ex parte hearings when played before judge and jury without 
opportunity for the defense to cross-examine. Therefore, state-
ments should be presumed testimonial if prosecutors and police 
are directly involved in the centers—they should not hide be-
hind the trick mirrors or camera lenses of the interview 
rooms,197 and determinations of whether a child has been 
abused should not be polluted by monetary incentives.198 The 
presumption that any statement made by a child during a fo-
rensic interview is testimonial should arise where: (1) police 
were directly involved with the questioning of the child or had a 
substantial physical presence, thus indicating prosecutorial 
pressure on the interviewer; or (2) where the child advocacy 
center is funded with money from prosecuting offices, thus in-
dicating an incentive for the center to prosecute and convict al-
leged abusers. 
While joint investigation statutes may still require collabo-
ration with law enforcement,199 to protect the rights of the ac-
cused and to protect the admissibility of nontestimonial state-
ments, the partnership should be as negligible as possible. 
Police and prosecutors may refer children to the centers, but 
they should not provide the interviewers with their version of 
the facts. To be truly multidisciplinary, interviewers must in-
dependently conduct the questioning which will help assess the 
child’s needs.200 
The state may overcome this testimonial presumption if it 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the involvement of 
 
 196. See, e.g., CornerHouse, Forensic Interview Services, supra note 18. 
 197. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 (discussing 
the importance of government involvement in the interview and the potential 
for abuse); In re Rolandis, 817 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (describing 
how police officers watched from a two-way mirror). 
 198. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 116, at 18 (alleging that the center has 
a financial incentive to find that child abuse had occurred in cases where it 
had not). 
 199. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006) (requiring prosecutors to work 
with social services who report potential child sexual abuse cases). 
 200. See State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 789–90 (Kan. 2007); State v. 
Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006) (arguing that the prosecutorial con-
nections to the child advocacy centers make the child advocates’ work prosecu-
torial). 
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law enforcement was ancillary to prosecution. Ancillary in-
volvement would include referrals, competency questions re-
garding the child, other communications required under state 
reporting laws, or communications relating to a different sus-
pect. 
B.  PRESUMPTION TWO: THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVE-THEORY 
TESTING 
A child victim’s statements should likewise be presump-
tively testimonial if the interviewer does not engage in alterna-
tive-theory testing of the child. This presumption will arise 
when interviewers fail to question the child on his understand-
ing of the truth, whether someone else might be the abuser, or 
how many times a child met with police officers or prosecutors. 
By failing to pursue this line of questioning, the interviewer 
rescinds the role of a holistic evaluator of the child’s welfare.201 
The questioning then becomes prosecutorial because it simply 
confirms what the state already believes. 
The state may rebut this presumption by proving with 
clear and convincing evidence that the interviewer was not at-
tempting to confirm a pre-established story, but that he appro-
priately explored alternative explanations. Factors would in-
clude whether the interviewer used nonleading questions 
throughout the interview, whether the interviewer questioned 
the child’s inconsistent statements without favoring one ver-
sion of events over another, whether the interviewer sought an 
explanation for inconsistencies with other existing evidence, 
and whether the interviewer conducted some inquiry into an 
alternative perpetrator. The state may also prove that alterna-
tive-theory testing was completed at a prior time. 
C.  THE APPLICATION AND BENEFITS OF THE PRESUMPTIONS 
Under this analysis, courts would be required to evaluate 
the statements on a case-by-case basis, but the presumptions 
will prevent state courts from ignoring testimonial circums-
tances by arbitrarily determining which one of the several pur-
poses of the interview is primary.202 When a testimonial pre-
 
 201. See CAMPBELL, supra note 117, at 61 (arguing that an interviewer’s 
failure to inquire into basic facts fuels false accusations); cf. Bobadilla III, 570 
F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110–11 (D. Minn. 2008) (criticizing a child advocacy inter-
viewer for using suggestive questions in what was “intended to substitute for a 
separate interrogation by the police”). 
 202. See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Minn. 2007) (arguing 
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sumption is held, a child’s statement would be inadmissible at 
trial if the child is not able to testify. This protects defendants 
from being convicted via videotape, and encourages child advo-
cacy centers to avoid being centers for ex parte examinations, 
thus strengthening their roles as true child welfare centers. 
To result in a greater admissibility of interview state-
ments, child advocacy centers should continue to follow a mul-
tidisciplinary approach, but in a way that integrates more med-
ical treatment, psychotherapy, and social services by 
extricating prosecutors and police from the interviews. Instead 
of using prosecution as a form of advocacy work, the centers 
should focus on policy work.203 By speaking at schools, 
churches, and community organizations, child advocates can 
teach about the devastating effects of child sexual abuse and 
the necessity of coming forward to stop its dangerous cycle.204 
CONCLUSION 
The safety, welfare, and health of the child are supposed to 
trump any goals of prosecution, or needs of the courts. Howev-
er, certain aspects of the forensic interviews at child advocacy 
centers can make a child’s out-of-court statements testimonial 
regardless of the primary purpose of the questions. This Note 
proposes that the Confrontation Clause analysis include rebut-
table presumptions that direct prosecutorial involvement and a 
lack of alternative-theory testing causes statements to be tes-
timonial. This solution not only protects defendants by ensur-
ing that courts focus on the true concerns of the Confrontation 
Clause, but it also aids children by encouraging child advocacy 
centers to limit prosecutorial involvement, thus protecting 
them against potential psychological pressures by overeager 
prosecutors. If such presumptions had been in place for Orlan-
do Bobadilla—where a police officer sat in his accuser’s inter-
view room while the questioner failed to test the truth of T.B.’s 
statements—his constitutional rights would not have been vi-
olated. 
 
that the intent of joint-investigation statutes makes statements nontestimoni-
al). 
 203. See NCAC, The CAC Model, supra note 18 (discussing possibilities for 
child advocacy policy work). 
 204. Id. 
